If there鈥檚 one area of New Zealand foreign policy that demands delicate diplomatic language from elected officials, it is the country鈥檚 nuclear-free status.
So when Defence Minister Chris Penk suggested it 鈥渨ould be helpful鈥� to have a conversation about the difference between nuclear weapons and nuclear propulsion, the response was swift.
Opposition parties questioned whether the government was planning a review of the , forcing Prime Minister Christopher Luxon to confirm there would be .
Unfortunately, the issue may not be that easy to avoid in the near future.
Penk was speaking at a security forum in Singapore and responding to a reporter鈥檚 query about what Australia鈥檚 acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines might mean for nuclear-free New Zealand.
That鈥檚 a fair question, given Australia is New Zealand鈥檚 only formal ally, and closer military relations between the two countries are central to the government鈥檚 .
The AUKUS factor
Penk鈥檚 comments were also timed unfortunately, coming a day after United States Secretary of War Pete Hegseth suggested New Zealand was 鈥溾�� as an ally, and defence spending at 2% of gross domestic product (GDP) was 鈥渘ot enough鈥�.
This tacit pressure comes at a time when has accelerated rapidly, wars and conflicts are expanding, and fears grow about a .
Hegseth is pushing for partner nations to 鈥渞each a level where 3.5% of national spending goes towards their own military鈥�.
That reflects the by NATO countries to invest 5% of GDP annually on defence and security by 2035 (with 3.5% on core military requirements).
New Zealand and Australia are not members, but both have with NATO. Australia currently spends 2.2% of its GDP on the military, and is by 2033.
New Zealand aims to hit the 2% target in 2032, which would bring spending broadly in line with peacetime military budgets . Whether that will be enough, however, is a key question 鈥� especially as advances in military technology gather pace.
For example, AUKUS partners are about to begin cooperating on the first 鈥淧illar II鈥� initiative, the development of . New Zealand is still officially weighing up Pillar II membership, although many of the practical steps required seem to be , and the price of entry to this club will be expensive.
Even outside AUKUS, New Zealand faces a steep bill to . While these vessels could supplement Australia鈥檚 purchase of and create efficiencies in the process, it would still stretch spending well beyond the 2% of GDP target.
Undermining nuclear-free law
There鈥檚 a wider perspective needed, too. Hegseth鈥檚 criticisms must be seen in the context of his administration鈥檚 undermining of the international rules-based order central to New Zealand foreign policy.
Any suggestion by a cabinet minister 鈥� however vaguely phrased or subsequently rejected by the prime minister 鈥� that part of the nuclear free policy might be on the negotiating table becomes doubly sensitive.
The prohibits the acquisition, testing or stationing of nuclear weapons in New Zealand. It also bans 鈥渆ntry into the internal waters [鈥 by any ship whose propulsion is wholly or partly dependent on nuclear power鈥�.
That means foreign vessels retain freedom of navigation rights, in accordance with international law, for peaceful transit through New Zealand鈥檚 territorial waters 鈥� but they can鈥檛 land.
Chipping away at part of the comprehensive anti-nuclear policy would undermine the overall purpose of the law:
to promote and encourage an active and effective contribution by New Zealand to the essential process of disarmament and international arms control.
New Zealand鈥檚 commitment to increase military spending should therefore be matched by support for initiatives that seek to reboot arms control, reduce the and to regulate .
As even the major nuclear powers concede, any future war between them . For a small power such as New Zealand, working to prevent such a catastrophe is the more important objective.
, Professor of Law,
This article is republished from under a Creative Commons license. Read the .
